After enormous public opposition, the Government cancelled its £1.8 billion national Digital ID programme on 21 July.

That was not merely the abandonment of a name, an app or a publicity campaign. It stopped a serious attempt to establish a standard government-backed identity credential with a compulsory role in everyday life.

To understand what was at stake, it is worth returning to the influential proposal for a “BritCard” published by Labour Together in June 2025.

Labour Together was not simply another think tank floating ideas from the sidelines. It became one of the key political vehicles behind Keir Starmer’s rise to the Labour leadership and the project that subsequently took Labour into government. Its then-director, Morgan McSweeney, used the organisation’s polling and political operation to support Starmer’s leadership bid before becoming the principal strategist behind Labour’s 2024 election victory and, ultimately, Starmer’s Downing Street chief of staff.

But the organisation – widely recognised as instrumental in the Starmer project – later became engulfed in scandal. It failed to report almost £740,000 in donations, resulting in a £14,250 Electoral Commission fine.

Under its next director, Josh Simons, Labour Together then commissioned a consultancy to investigate journalists examining those undeclared donations. Simons subsequently became the government minister responsible for digital ID, but resigned under pressure when the affair became public. He later stepped down as MP for Makerfield, creating the vacancy through which Andy Burnham returned to Parliament.

Against this backdrop, Labour Together recently rebranded as ThinkLabour.

The history matters because its BritCard report cannot be dismissed as a random suggestion from an outside think tank. It came from an organisation deeply embedded in the political project that took Starmer into Downing Street.

The report was not the Government’s precise blueprint, and we should not claim that every detail became official policy. But it set out the clearest developed version of the idea – and Downing Street was reported to be exploring its proposals almost immediately after publication.

The personnel links were also direct.

One of the report’s three authors, Kirsty Innes (who, in 2021 was pushing vaccine passports as part of the Tony Blair Institute), subsequently became special adviser to Liz Kendall, then Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology – the department responsible for government digital policy. Innes’ appointment was first reported in September 2025, shortly before Starmer formally announced the national Digital ID proposal, and was later reported by the Guardian and confirmed in the Government’s official register of special advisers. Another co-author, Morgan Wild (who we debated), also subsequently became a government special adviser.

What did the BritCard report propose?

The report proposed what it explicitly called a “mandatory, universal, national identity credential”.

Under its proposals:

• the Government would issue a digital credential to everyone with the right to live or work in the UK;
• British citizens would become eligible from the age of 16;
• the credential would be stored on a smartphone and accessed through GOV.UK Wallet;
• One Login would provide the identity-verification layer;
• it would become compulsory for new workers and tenants—and for the employers and landlords checking them—to use;
• right-to-work and right-to-rent checks would create records available to the Home Office;
• that information could be cross-checked against PAYE, Companies House and landlord data;
• and the same system could later support proof of age, driving information, healthcare records and other government-issued credentials.

The report even proposed relaunching the GOV.UK App and Wallet as the “BritCard App”, making the identity system what it described as a familiar feature of daily life for everyone in the country.

This was not simply a more convenient way to log in to government.

It was a proposal to turn existing components – including GOV.UK One Login and GOV.UK Wallet – into a universal identity system, with people required to use it when starting a new job or renting a home.

The Government’s eventual proposal was not identical to every detail in the BritCard report. But it adopted its central direction: a national digital identity credential, built upon the infrastructure already being developed and initially tied to compulsory digital right-to-work checks.

Had it proceeded, the Government would have gained a powerful political and practical platform from which Digital ID could have spread much further across public services and everyday life.

Stopping that mattered.

One Login remains – though it is not the same thing

One Login is primarily the Government’s common account, sign-in and identity-verification platform.

Instead of creating separate accounts for different departments, someone can create one account – normally using an email address, password and security code – which can be used across government services that have joined the system.

Sometimes One Login is used only to sign in.

In those cases, it confirms that you can authenticate yourself as the person controlling the account. It does not necessarily establish your real-world identity.

For other services, One Login also asks you to prove who you are. This may involve scanning photographic identification, matching your face to it, answering questions based on government or financial records, or taking documents to a Post Office after beginning the process online.

Once completed, the verified identity can be connected to the account and the check may be reused when accessing other government services.

One Login can therefore perform two distinct functions:

1. Confirm that you control a particular online account.
2. Confirm your real-world identity when a government service requires it.

Not every One Login account currently involves the second function.

That makes One Login materially different from the national Digital ID proposal.

There is currently no general requirement for every adult to possess a One Login account. One Login is principally used to access government services, rather than as a universal identity credential across society.

A person can also delete their One Login account. The Government says this will delete the account and the proven identity information held within it; however deleting One Login does not erase information already held independently by government departments. One Login also retains system logs for one year and a secure audit trail for seven years for fraud monitoring. Deleting an account may prevent someone from using services that depend upon it.

Nevertheless, a deletable account used for particular government services is materially different from a national identity credential required in order to work or rent a home.

What would the national Digital ID have changed?

One Login already allows people to sign in to government services and, where required, prove their identity.

The proposed national Digital ID would have gone significantly further. It would have created a standard government-backed identity credential, designed for much wider use – including outside government – and made its use compulsory in some circumstances.

In practical terms, it would have changed five important things:

1. A general identity credential

One Login can verify somebody’s identity for a particular service.

The proposed national Digital ID would have provided a standard identity credential that could be presented repeatedly as official proof of who the person was.

2. Much wider coverage

Millions of people already have One Login accounts, but not everybody has one and not every account is connected to a verified real-world identity.

The national scheme was intended to achieve far wider coverage. The BritCard model proposed issuing the credential to everyone with the right to live or work in the UK, with British citizens becoming eligible at 16. Later, Simons confirmed plans to consult on extending Digital ID to 13-year-olds – and, when subsequently asked about allocating digital identities from birth, declined to rule that out.

3. Use beyond government

One Login is principally a gateway into government services.

The proposed Digital ID was intended to operate across organisational boundaries. Employers, landlords and potentially other approved organisations could have relied upon the same government-backed credential.

4. Compulsory use

There is no universal law requiring everybody to possess One Login. 

The national Digital ID proposal went further. As originally announced, digital identity would have been required for right-to-work checks.

People might not have been stopped in the street and ordered to show it. But their ability to take lawful employment would have depended upon participation in the system.

5. Standardised reuse

One Login already aims to allow identity checks to be reused across government services.

A national Digital ID would have extended that principle by providing a standard credential that could be repeatedly presented to different organisations.

This may sound convenient. But it also creates a common point of dependency: an error, exclusion or loss of access could have consequences across several otherwise unrelated areas of life.

Was the national Digital ID just another credential?

It would have been a credential – but also much more than one.

A credential is simply a trusted proof of something about you.

A driving licence proves your identity, age and entitlement to drive. A Veteran Card proves veteran status. A certificate may prove a qualification.

A digital credential is the electronic equivalent: an official proof that can be stored and presented electronically.

But a national Digital ID system also involves:

• how people enrol and prove who they are;
• what information is connected to their identity;
• which organisations can request or check it;
• when they are permitted or required to do so;
• what information is recorded when it is used;
• how those records can be combined with other data;
• how errors can be challenged;
• and what alternatives remain available.

The proposed national Digital ID was therefore not simply another document to place in the Wallet. It would have been a wider identity system governing how that document was issued, checked and used.

What was actually achieved by stopping it?

Cancelling the national Digital ID programme prevented something concrete:

• a standard government-backed national identity credential;
• a proposed £1.8 billion programme (at least!);
• compulsory digital identity in right-to-work checks;
• far wider population coverage;
• use of the same credential across different organisations;
• and a political mandate from which the system could have expanded much further.

The Government did not dismantle every existing digital system. But it was prevented from taking those systems to the next stage under an explicit national programme.

This distinction is crucial. If One Login already did everything the national Digital ID was supposed to do, there would have been little reason to announce and fund a separate £1.8 billion programme.

The national Digital ID was proposed because it would have added something: greater reach, a standard credential, wider acceptance and compulsory use.

Those additions were stopped, and that was vital.

The central issue is conditionality

Taking a step back, the existence of an account, app or digital credential is not, by itself, the central problem.

The real question is: what becomes conditional upon using it?

Can you work without it?

Can you rent a home without it?

Can you meet your legal obligations without it?

Can you access government without it?

Can you participate in society without repeatedly proving your identity, age or eligibility?

Is the alternative free, equally usable and genuinely available?

Does refusing the digital route result in additional cost, delay or poorer service?

The original national Digital ID proposal would have made the ability to work conditional upon participation in a national digital identity system.

Stopping it prevented that specific and extremely important form of conditionality from being imposed through the proposed scheme.

Related systems have not disappeared

Despite all this, right now One Login continues to expand, and the Government says that, over time, One Login will replace other ways of signing in to services on GOV.UK, including Government Gateway.

The GOV.UK App remains.

GOV.UK Wallet and government-issued digital credentials remain.

Individual services and legal obligations can still require people to verify their identities.

Public and private organisations are increasingly being equipped to check digital proofs of identity, age or eligibility.

This means the wider risks have not disappeared. But we should also distinguish between:

• a capability existing and that capability actually being used;
• systems being technically able to connect and all their data already being combined;
• a possible future expansion and a settled government intention;
• an optional credential and a compulsory identity system.

One Login, the App, Wallet and individual credentials remain distinct systems with different functions. Their existence does not automatically mean there is already one giant national identity database – but together they provide much of the practical machinery from which something more powerful could be built.

Company directors show how the boundary can be eroded

Company directors and people with significant control must now verify their identity to fulfil a legal obligation.

The Government’s free route uses One Login. The only way to avoid One Login is to use an authorised provider, such as an accountant or solicitor, which will commonly charge a fee.

Directors have not literally been ordered to create a One Login account.

But in practice their choice can become:

Use One Login – or pay to avoid it.

Directors thus face both elements of concern at once: their real-world identity must be verified and connected, and One Login is difficult or costly to avoid when meeting that legal obligation.

This demonstrates how participation in digital identity infrastructure can become effectively compulsory without Parliament passing a law requiring every citizen to possess a national Digital ID.

It is also why stopping the national scheme, while vital, cannot be the end of the campaign.

From one political limit to enforceable limits

Frankly, in trying ham-fistedly to impose an explicit national Digital ID, the Starmer Government probably did us all a massive favour.

Some now claim the public would never have accepted Digital ID anyway. But that is writing history backwards.

Just as lockdowns, school closures and vaccine passports were popular… just as many have been persuaded that “under 16 social media bans” are good news, polling had suggested considerable support for the imposition of Digital ID. 

And you may remember the policy was sold hard initially as a way of “getting tough on illegal immigration.” It probably looked good on paper – but it backfired spectacularly.

They put an issue that could easily have been kept obscure and seemingly technical on the map for millions of people – and discovered that the public would not accept a national identity credential becoming a compulsory condition of employment and potentially spreading into other areas of everyday life.

That political limit must now be extended to the capabilities of the systems that remain, and could appear in future.

It is not enough for ministers to say that One Login is not officially called a national Digital ID.

Clear and enforceable boundaries are needed around:

• where identity verification may be required;
• which services can connect a verified identity to a One Login account;
• when an identity check may be reused for another purpose;
• what information government departments can exchange or combine;
• which public or private organisations can request digital credentials;
• what records are created when credentials are checked;
• whether participation remains genuinely voluntary;
• and what free, equally usable alternatives must be maintained.

The Government should not be allowed to reach the same destination gradually simply because it no longer travels under the banner of a “national Digital ID”.

If Parliament would not approve a universal identity system in one piece, departments should not be able to assemble its practical equivalent through hundreds of separate service decisions made without proper public scrutiny.

The political boundary created by the cancellation must therefore become a governance boundary around the technology itself.

Could “Digital ID” still return by the back door?

Yes – and this remains a genuine risk.

One Login can provide the common account and reusable identity check.

Wallet can hold official credentials.

The App can bring government services and documents together.

Public and private organisations can request digital proof of identity, age or eligibility.

Individual laws and policies can introduce digital verification into particular areas of life.

If these systems continue expanding without proper limits, key features of a national Digital ID could gradually be recreated:

• service by service;
• credential by credential;
• and obligation by obligation.

A real victory – and the next battle

We should be neither complacent nor defeatist.

Stopping the national Digital ID programme was a major victory and proof that determined public opposition can change what government does.

But stopping the proposal was not the same as dismantling every component with the potential to cause problems.

Together is therefore calling for:

1. An immediate freeze on further One Login expansion pending an independent National Audit Office review.
2. Proper parliamentary scrutiny and firm safeguards for privacy and civil liberties before any further expansion.
3. A statutory guarantee of free, genuinely equivalent non-digital alternatives – without additional cost, delay or poorer service.

The public drew a line when it came to national Digital ID.

Now we must draw equally clear lines around what remaining and future systems are allowed to do. If we do not, the danger is that the outcome people rejected will be recreated gradually by the back door.

Please look out for imminent supporter actions – and help us make sure that doesn’t happen.